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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Friends of the 2017 World Series of Poker Tournament Champion, Scott 
Blumstein, had more to celebrate than just the nearly $8.15 million their buddy 
recently won.2 Along for the wild ride emotionally and financially, Blumstein’s 
friends each contributed $60 towards his tournament buy-in and were each 
subsequently rewarded in the amount of $40,750 upon his victory.3 This practice 
of financially backing a professional competitor, commonly known as 
“staking,”4 provided Blumstein’s friends an opportunity to capture not only a 
piece of Blumstein’s glory, but also a return on their investment. 
Common among many professional and competitive sports, including poker, 
golf,5 tennis,6 and recently popular eSports,7 a staking agreement is broadly 
defined as an agreement between a professional competitor and a benefactor in 
which the benefactor financially sponsors the professional to be able to compete, 
                                                        
1   The author is a May 2019 Juris Doctor Candidate at the University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law, and a Junior Editor of the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas, Gaming Law Journal. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 
Economics from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas in 2013.  The author wishes 
to thank Professor Benjamin Edwards for his encouragement, counsel, and expertise 
in securities law. 
2   See Jon Sofen, Friends Who Invested in WSOP 2017 Main Event Winner Scott 
Blumstein Now $40K Richer, CARDSCHAT NEWS (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.cardschat.com/news/friends-invested-wsop-2017-main-event-winner-
scott-blumstein-40k-richer-49087. 
3   Id. 
4   Leslie Albrecht, How to turn $60 into $40,0000: Invest in a poker player and get 
lucky, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 1, 2017, 9:22 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/how-to-turn-60-into-40000-invest-in-a-poker-player-and-get-lucky-2017-07-
31. 
5   See, e.g., Sutton v. Smith, 603 So.2d 693, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
6   See, e.g., Julia La Roche, Meet The 16-Year-Old US Open Tennis Phenom Backed 
By Bill Ackman, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/bill-ackman-sponsors-us-open-francis-tiafoe-2014 
-8. 
7   See Will Green, Esports Staking Industry Emerges With YouStake, Rivalcade 
Partnership, THE LINES (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thelines.com/esports-staking-
industry-YouStake-rivalcade/. 
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and in exchange, receives a return as a percentage of the competitor’s resultant 
winnings.8 The split varies dependent upon the sport, and ranges from twenty 
percent9 to fifty percent10 of the player’s winning proceeds. 
Staking agreements made with poker professionals are not a new 
phenomenon, and have historically occurred between friends or acquaintances.11 
More often than not, these deals were (and many still are) informal in nature: the 
parties come to terms of the agreements orally and execute the arrangement by 
“handshake.”12 The informal nature of staking agreements has therefore kept 
these contracts hidden from the ever-watchful eye of state and federal regulatory 
agencies. This, however, is quickly changing. The recent emergence of online 
staking services, such as YouStake, IMAWHALE, ChipMeUP, and TastyStakes, 
has pushed the formerly back-room, handshake deals into the public spotlight, 
and both state and federal regulatory agencies have taken notice.13 
Now aware of staking arrangements on a public level, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Agency (FINRA) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
have begun to investigate whether these agreements are securities as defined by 
the Securities Act of 1933.14 This Essay suggests that staking agreements, by 
their very nature, are securities. Part I includes an overview of how Nevada 
currently defines securities, as well as an analysis of how Nevada might define 
staking agreements under Nevada law and case precedent. This article’s analysis 
focuses on Nevada because of the extensive gambling precedent that exists there 
and the historically pervasive poker staking in the state. Part II analyzes staking 
agreements through the lens of the federal securities definition test as proposed 
by SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., commonly termed the “Howey test.”15 Finally, Part 
III will analyze the potential consequences of state and federal regulatory 
agencies defining staking agreements as securities. 
 
 
                                                        
8   See Albrecht supra note 4. 
9   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145 (Nev. 1985). 
10   See Donnie Peters, Jason Mercier Gives Insight into the World of Staking, 
POKERNEWS (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.pokernews.com/news/2012/10/jason-
mercier-gives-insight-into-the-world-of-staking-13579.htm. 
11   See Albrecht supra note 4. 
12   See Keith Romer, Hedging Their Bets: How The Pros Diversify Their Poker 
Portfolios, NPR (Mar. 24, 2016, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/24/471684 
998/hedging-their-bets-how-the-pros-diversify-their-poker-portfolios. 
13   See YOUSTAKE, https://YouStake.com (last visited May 15, 2019); 
IMAWHALE, https://imawhale.com (last visited May 15, 2019); CHIPMEUP, 
https://www.chipmeup.com (last visited May 15, 2019); TASTYSTAKES, 
https://tastystakes.com (last visited May 15, 2019). 
14   Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012). See, e.g., Haley Hintze, 
YouStake Sues SEC, Seeks Declaratory Judgment Over Online Staking Legality, 
FLUSHDRAW (July 7, 2017) http://www.flushdraw.net/news/youstake-sues-sec-
seeks-declaratory-judgment-online-staking-legality/. 
15   See generally SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. et al., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
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II. STAKING AGREEMENT DEFINITIONS UNDER NEVADA LAW 
 
A. Staking Agreements as Investment Contracts Under Nevada Law 
 
In the spring of 1983, Tom McEvoy, a poker professional, entered into an 
oral agreement with Martin Sigel wherein Sigel would financially back McEvoy 
to enter the World Series of Poker Tournament hosted by Binion’s Horseshoe 
Club in Las Vegas.16 In exchange for this capital funding, the staking agreement 
required McEvoy to pay Sigel twenty percent of any proceeds from his poker 
winnings arising from the tournament.17 McEvoy, later inducted into the Poker 
Hall of Fame in 2013,18 did not disappoint, and won two tournaments to the tune 
of $657,000.19 Sigel later alleged that McEvoy had paid him only $21,400 of the 
$131,400 that McEvoy contractually owed Sigel.20 
In the litigation that followed, the poker champion argued that the $110,000 
difference was a gambling debt and thereby not legally enforceable in Nevada.21 
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed, citing case precedent wherein a 
contractual arrangement between two parties regarding payment via gambling 
winning proceeds was defined by the court as a “legitimate business 
arrangement” and therefore not a common law gambling debt.22 In so ruling, the 
Nevada Supreme Court had indirectly decided that a staking agreement made 
between a professional gambler and his or her benefactor was a legitimate 
business arrangement.23 
 
B. Nevada Gaming Control Board 
 
Despite the Nevada Supreme Court’s recognition in Sigel that staking 
agreements are legitimate contracts capable of enforcement, Nevada appears 
reluctant to attempt to regulate staking agreements outside of general contract 
principles. In 2015, the Nevada Legislature enacted a statute that made it 
                                                        
16   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145 (Nev. 1985). 
17   Id. 
18   Seth Palansky, Poker Hall of Fame Announces Class of 2018, WSOP.COM (July 
12, 2018, 10:48 PM), http://www.wsop.com/news/2018/Jul/10710/POKER-HALL-
OF-FAME-ANNOUNCES-CLASS-OF-2018.html. See also WSOP Player Profile: 
Tom McEvoy, WSOP.COM, http://www.wsop.com/players/profile/?playerid=238 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (Tom McEvoy became the World Series of Poker 
Tournament Champion in the 1983 main event tournament and has won, to date, 
approximately $1.3 million dollars from poker tournaments around the United 
States). 
19   Sigel, 707 P.2d at 1145. 
20   Id. 
21   Id. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.361(1) (1983). 
22   Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Nev. 1985) (citing Johnston v. DeLay, 
158 P.2d 547 (Nev. 1945)). 
23   See id. 
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“unlawful for a person to receive. . .any compensation or reward, or any 
percentage or share of the money. . .upon the result of any event held at a . . . 
sporting event or other event. . .without having first procured. . .gaming 
licenses. . ..”24 When the professional poker industry learned of this legislation, 
many feared that it would prohibit poker staking absent expensive gaming 
licenses.25 Quick to allay the fears of poker professionals and consumers, the 
Nevada Gaming Control Board Chairman assured players that the bill “related to 
sports betting only” and did not regulate poker in any fashion.26 
 
C. Securities as Defined by NRS §90.295 
 
Despite the Nevada Gaming Control Board’s reluctance to regulate staking 
agreements, these now legitimate contracts meet the definition of a “security” 
under Nevada statutory law.  In pertinent part, NRS § 90.295 states: 
“Security” means a note, stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement. . .investment 
contract. . .or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
security. . .or participation in. . .whole or partial guarantee of or warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing.27 
According to this statutory definition, it seems likely that Nevada would 
define staking agreements as securities. Staking agreements, by their nature, 
involve the participation of two individuals in a “profit-sharing agreement” 
wherein the investing benefactor is recipient to the “profits” of a professional 
competitor in return for their investment.28 
Nevada legislators have granted power to the state Executive Branch to 
further analyze and define terminology under Chapter 90 of the Nevada Revised 
Statutes “necessary for an understanding of the provisions of this chapter[.]”29 In 
1992, the Nevada Secretary of State issued an administrative interpretation of the 
term “investment contract.”30 Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) § 90.090 
defines the term “investment contract” (as used in NRS § 90.295) as: 
                                                        
24   NEV. REV. STAT. § 465.086(1) (2015). 
25   See Katie Barlowe, New Nevada Gambling Bill Could End Poker Staking 
Agreements (Or Not), CASINO.ORG (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.casino.org/news/ 
new-nevada-gambling-bill-could-end-poker-staking-agreements-or-not;  
Jason Glatzer, Poker Players Won’t Be Affected by Anti-Staking Bill in Nevada, 
POKERNEWS (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.pokernews.com/news/2015/01/will-
nevada-prohibit-poker-staking-including-for-the-wsop-20467.htm. 
26   See Jocelyn Wood, Poker Staking is Safe in Nevada, POKERFUSE (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://pokerfuse.com/news/law-and-regulation/26424-poker-staking-safe-nevada/. 
27   NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.295 (2019) (emphasis added). 
28   See generally id. 
29   Id. § 90.750(1) (“The Administrator may adopt regulations further defining such 
words and terms as are necessary for an understanding of the provisions of this 
chapter and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto.”). 
30   NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 90.090 (2017). 
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1. Any investment in a common enterprise with the 
expectation of profit to be derived substantially through the 
efforts of a promoter or other third party; or 
2. Any investment by which: 
a.  An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror; 
b. A portion of this initial value is subjected to the 
risks of the enterprise; 
c. The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the 
offeror’s promises or representations which give 
rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable 
benefit of some kind over and above the initial 
value will accrue to the offeree as a result of the 
operation of the enterprise; and 
d. The offeree does not receive the right to exercise 
practical or actual control over the managerial 
decisions of the enterprise.31 
 
According to this interpretive definition, the Nevada Secretary of State could 
likely define staking agreements as investment contracts. The professional 
competitor party to a staking agreement receives capital from a benefactor in 
exchange for an initial value equal to a percentage of the competitor’s resultant 
winnings.32 The percentage return a benefactor receives varies greatly but is 
often between twenty and fifty percent.33 
The benefactor’s return is subject entirely to the competitor’s success or 
failure within his or her competition. A benefactor receives nothing in return 
from a competitor that fails to win.  The benefactor’s return is also subject to the 
total amount given to the competitor as an award for winning his or her 
competition, and therefore the prize for placing first, second or third may vary 
greatly.34 
Next, a competitor induces a benefactor to fund their ability to compete by 
representing that the benefactor will receive a return that is often well above the 
initial amount provided to the competitor.35 For example, the 2017 World Series 
of Poker Tournament Main Event required a $10,000 buy-in with an $8.15 
                                                        
31   Id. 
32   See generally Peters, supra note 10. 
33   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145 (Nev. 1985); Peters supra note 10. 
34   See Robert Kirschen, Justin Bonomo Wins 2018 Big One For One Drop, 
WSOP.COM (July 18, 2018, 2:48 AM), http://www.wsop.com/news/2018/Jul/10723/ 
JUSTIN-BONOMO-WINS-2018-BIG-ONE-FOR-ONE-DROP.html (The 2018 
World Series of Poker’s “The Big One for One Drop” event drew twenty-seven 
participants and paid out $10 million to the first place winner, $6 million to the 
second place player, and $4 million to the third place winner). 
35   See generally Sofen, supra note 2. 
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million first-place award.36 A benefactor that funds the entire $10,000 buy-in and 
receives but a single percent of a first place award is entitled to an $81,500 return. 
Again, an agreement’s agreed return on winnings is often much greater than one 
percent.37 
Finally, staking agreements generally do not allow the benefactor to manage 
the professional competitor.38 Staking agreements do not allow the benefactor to 
manage how the professional competes, nor does it allow for the benefactor to 
manage the professional outside the competition, including how the competitor 
behaves prior to, during and after the competition.39 A question may arise, 
however, if the terms of the agreement include a refund to the benefactor where 
the competitor does not specifically perform in competing; even in this 
circumstance, the benefactor does not manage the competitor in any fashion as 
to compel or dissuade him/her from competing, and therefore likely meets this 
last requirement under Nevada Administrative Code section 90.090.40 
 
D. NRS § 90.530(11) Registration Exemption 
 
While Nevada might define a staking agreement as a security pursuant to 
NRS § 90.295, it is also likely that a staking agreement security is exempt from 
registration with the Nevada Securities Division. Nevada law requires offerors 
of a security to register the offering with the Nevada Securities Division prior to 
any sale of the security to the public.41 There are, however, exceptions to the 
registration requirement. In pertinent part, NRS § 90.530(11)(a) grants 
exemption from the registration requirement where “[t]he transaction is part of 
an issue in which there are not more than 35 purchasers in this State, other than 
those designated in subsection 10, during any 12 consecutive months. . ..”42 
A staking agreement, despite meeting the technical definition of a security, 
may therefore escape the registration requirements given the limited number of 
                                                        
36   Id. 
37   See Sigel, 707 P.2d at 1145. See also Peters, supra note 10. 
38   See David Huber, Lee Childs Wins Historic Court Case Between Backer and 
Stakee, POKERFUSE (June 3, 2014), https://pokerfuse.com/news/law-and-regulation/ 
2014-06-03-lee-childs-wins-historic-court-case-between-backer-and-stakee/  
(In 2013, a six-person jury in New Jersey found certain clauses in a poker staking 
agreement unreasonable because they placed burdensome requirements upon the 
competitor. These requirements included providing the agreement benefactor with a 
competition calendar six months in advance and that the competitor “always play to 
the best of [his] ability.”). 
39   See id. 
40   See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 90.090(d) (2017). See generally David Zeitlin, 
Mitchnick v. Childs, A Cautionary Tale of Actual Poker Justice, DAVIDZEITLIN, 
https://davidzeitlin.com/mitchnick-v-childs-a-cautionary-tale-of-actual-poker-
justice/ (last visited May 15, 2019). 
41   NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.460 (2019). 
42   Id. § 90.530(11)(a). 
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individuals that partake in the agreement. The most common form of staking 
agreements, like the agreement between Mr. Sigel and Mr. McEvoy, involve but 
two individuals, only one of which is the investor.43 Even larger businesses, such 
as YouStake or TastyStakes, could limit the number of investors in a given 
professional competitor’s staking agreement to also escape state registration 
requirements. Given the small size of participants in the investment venture and 
the exemption under NRS § 90.530(11), it is therefore likely that a majority of 
staking agreements are exempt from state registration. 
While staking agreements may escape registering with the state of Nevada, 
it is much less likely that they will escape federal registration requirements 
applied by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 
III.  FEDERAL LAW 
 
Expanding beyond the often secretive staking agreements, YouStake, Inc. 
(“YouStake”) developed an online platform to facilitate staking agreements 
between professional competitors and members of the public.44 Launched in 
2015, YouStake, Inc. sought to bring staking agreements into the open market 
and increase opportunities for athletic competitors and public investors.45 A 
majority of the agreements hosted on YouStake’s website are poker professionals 
seeking capital contributions, but YouStake’s platform hosts staking agreements 
for other athletic activities, including golf, tennis, drone racing, eSports, and even 
mixed martial arts.46 
It wasn’t long, however, before federal regulatory agencies began to 
examine the service that YouStake was facilitating. The United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that it is the responsibility and task of the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and the federal courts to determine when an interest 
between two parties constitutes a security under the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1933 (“Securities Act”).47 In April 2016, the SEC issued subpoenas to 
YouStake regarding the newly opened SEC investigation.48 YouStake has since 
commenced litigation against the SEC claiming that another federal regulatory 
agency, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), has assured 
                                                        
43   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145 (Nev. 1985). 
44   See Learn All About YouStake, YOUSTAKE, https://YouStake.com/about (last 
visited May 15, 2019); Jackie M. Jensen, Meet YouStake: Marketplace for Fans to 
Invest in Sports Players, VEGASTECH (Feb. 7, 2016), https://vegastech.com/2016/02 
/08/meet-youstake-invest-in-sports-players/. 
45   Id. 
46   See Find Players to Fund, YOUSTAKE, https://YouStake.com/stake-a-player (last 
visited May 15, 2019). See also YouStake, NETCAPITAL, netcapital.com/companies/ 
youstake (last visited May 15, 2019). 
47   See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975). 
48   Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 4, YouStake, Inc. et al. v. Clayton et al., 
No. 5:17cv00065 (W.D. Va. July 7, 2017). 
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YouStake that the staking agreements they offer are not securities under current 
federal securities law.49 On December 18, 2017 the SEC informed YouStake that 
it would not be recommending enforcement action against YouStake and that it 
does not currently consider YouStake’s business model as offering securities.50 
The SEC likely used the test from SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. et al. (commonly 
known as the “Howey test”) to determine whether YouStake’s staking 
agreements constitute securities under the Securities Act.51 While the SEC 
ultimately did not recommend enforcement action against YouStake, it is likely 
that under the Howey test staking agreements are indeed investment contracts 
and therefore securities under the Securities Act. 
 
A. “Security” Defined by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 
 
Congress adopted the Securities Act for two primary purposes: to (1) provide 
investors with financial and other significant information concerning securities 
being offered for public sale, and (2) “prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and 
other fraud in the sale of securities.”52 In pertinent part, the Securities Act defined 
a “security” as follows: 
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement. . .investment 
contract. . .or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
“security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing.53 
Since the enactment of the Securities Act, however, litigants before the 
United States Supreme Court have disputed interpretation of the Act’s security 
definition and its application to uncommon contractual arrangements between 
two parties.54 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in one such case, 
commonly known as the Howey case, remains the cornerstone precedent in 
defining investment contracts under the Securities Act.55 
                                                        
49   Id. at 6–7 (FINRA asked YouStake to withdraw its application for the sale of a 
security stating that staking activity does not constitute a security under federal law, 
and that staking regulation was outside the scope of FINRA’s regulatory authority.). 
50   SEC Drops YouStake Investigation, Countering Action Dismissed, FLUSHDRAW 
(Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.flushdraw.net/misc/sec-drops-YouStake-investigation-
countering-action-dismissed. 
51   See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. et al., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); discussion infra 
Section III(b). 
52   The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 
1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html. 
53   Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
54   See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1982); Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 332–33 (1967); W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 297. 
55   Id. at 293. See also James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in 
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B. The Howey Test 
 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. et al. came before the United States Supreme Court 
shortly after adoption of the Securities Act in 1933.56 In Howey, the court 
determined whether service contracts between a Florida citrus fruit cultivating 
company and individual leaseholders constituted a security under the Securities 
Act.57 These service contracts allowed individuals to purchase ten-year leasehold 
interests in citrus grove acreage cultivated and managed by the W.J. Howey 
Company.58 In assessing whether such service contracts constituted securities 
under the Securities Act, the court employed a four prong test: 
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common 
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promotor or 
third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced 
by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in 
the enterprise.59 
Today, the court’s decision in Howey has produced four elements necessary 
for an offering to constitute a security: (1) An individual invests money, (2) in a 
common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of a profit, and (4) where the profit 
is realized through the efforts of someone else.60 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that an offering need not be of a common nature and that “[n]ovel, 
uncommon, or irregular devices” may be governed under the scope of the 
Securities Act.61 As the cornerstone case defining securities pursuant to the 
Securities Act, the SEC will likely use the Howey test to determine whether 
staking agreements are securities. 
 
1. Howey Test Element One: “Individual Invests Money” 
 
The first prong of the Howey test, namely whether an individual is investing 
money or capital, is likely met by the current common structures of staking 
agreements. While seemingly straightforward, litigants have contested this prong 
of the Howey test since its adoption. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided Warfield 
v. Alaniz, wherein financial planners convinced investors to make irrevocable 
charitable donations to a “charitable gift annuity” with the promise that the 
investor would receive back a lifelong stream of income that would proceed to a 
                                                        
Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 65 (2011) (“The leading case regarding 
the definition of investment contracts is SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.”). 
56   See W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 293–294. 
57   Id. at 294–97. 
58   Id. at 295–96. 
59   Id. at 298–99. 
60   Id. 
61   SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. et al., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). 
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charitable organization at the time of their death.62 The defendants in Warfield 
argued that the charitable gift annuities were not securities because the investors 
intended to make charitable donations rather than invest for financial gain, and 
thereby did not make any investment of money or capital.63 The Court rejected 
this argument stating that the Howey test’s first prong is met where an individual 
investor “commit[s] his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to subject 
himself to financial loss.”64 The Court held that investors risked financial loss by 
investing in an enterprise that could possibly not honor its contractual promises.65 
Staking agreements likely fulfill the “investment of money” prong of the 
Howey test according to Warfield’s financial loss test. Taking the staking 
agreement between Tom McEvoy and Martin Sigel as an example, Sigel funded 
McEvoy with the expectation of sharing in any award that McEvoy might win in 
the WSOP tournament.66 The very nature of this expectation implies that Sigel 
was wholly aware that there existed a possibility McEvoy could lose the 
tournament. If McEvoy did lose and did not recover any award proceeds, then 
Sigel would collect neither any share of award proceeds, nor reimbursement from 
McEvoy for his initial capital investment. Sigel, therefore, risked financial loss 
by providing McEvoy with the initial funding to enter the WSOP tournament and 
likely fulfills the first prong of the Howey test. 
 
2. Howey Test Element Two: “In a Common Enterprise” 
 
After the U.S. Supreme Court defined an investment contract as requiring 
investment “in a common enterprise” (also known as the commonality 
requirement), the various circuit courts issued decisions that vary greatly in their 
definition of what constitutes a “common enterprise.”67 The resultant separate 
categories of the commonality requirement now include horizontal commonality, 
narrow vertical commonality, and broad vertical commonality.68 Horizontal 
commonality is satisfied where an investor pools resources with other investors 
and the profits of the investors are dependent upon the overall success of the 
venture, whereas vertical commonality is satisfied where each individual 
investor’s return is dependent upon the promoter/manager’s efforts.69 Vertical 
                                                        
62   See Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009). Sold from 
1996 to 2001, these charitable gift annuity investment products were wildly popular. 
Unfortunately for the investors, the organization that offered this product was 
nothing more than a Ponzi scheme in which the organization used investor capital to 
pay off early annuitants and commission payments to financial planners. Id. at 1018.  
63   Id. at 1021. 
64   Id. 
65   Id. 
66   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145 (Nev. 1985). 
67   Gordon, supra note 55, at 60–61, 68.  
68   Id. at 61–62. 
69   Id. at 66–67. 
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commonality is further bifurcated into narrow vertical commonality and broad 
vertical commonality, discussed in depth below. Ultimately, it is likely that 
staking agreements satisfy horizontal, narrow vertical and broad vertical 
commonality. 
 
a. Horizontal Commonality 
 
Currently, horizontal commonality is the categorical commonality 
requirement used by the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits; the Second Circuit 
accepts horizontal commonality but has not ruled on vertical commonality.70 As 
described by the Seventh Circuit in Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., horizontal 
commonality consists of “a pooling of interest[] not only between 
the. . .promoter and each individual ‘investor’ but also among the 
‘investors’. . ..”71 This pooling often follows an agreed upon pro-rata basis for 
the distribution of profits.72 Furthermore, the profits returned to each investor are 
dependent upon the “profitability of the enterprise as a whole[.]”73 
Staking agreements likely fulfill both requirements of horizontal 
commonality, if the SEC or a federal court would use horizontal commonality as 
a basis for defining a “common enterprise.” Investors in staking agreements 
provide contributions to a pool of capital to permit the professional to participate 
in the activity the professional desires.74 This is true if the staking agreement 
consists of one benefactor and one professional or, as is the case with businesses 
such as YouStake, multiple investors pooling resources to allow a professional 
to compete. Furthermore, the distribution of a professional’s award winnings 
often occurs on a pro-rata basis where there exist multiple investors, such as in 
the example of Scott Blumstein and his college friends.75 Finally, any award 
proceeds distributed to a single or multiple investors is contingent upon the 
success of the professional, i.e. the profitability of the enterprise as a whole.76 In 
other words, the resources that are pooled by a single or multiple investors allow 
the professional to compete with the goal of achieving large award winnings and 
achievement of that award results in profitability for each individual investor 
based upon a pro-rata share. Equally important for horizontal commonality, 
failure to achieve an award results in a loss to each individual investor, regardless 
                                                        
70   Id. at 68. See also Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1017 (7th Cir. 1994); Newmyer et al. v. 
Philatelic Leasing, Ltd. et al., 888 F.2d 385, 394 (6th Cir. 1989); Salcer v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. et al., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982).  
71   Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018. 
72   Revak, 18 F.3d at 87. 
73   Id. 
74   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Nev. 1985). See also Peters, supra 
note 10. 
75   Sofen, supra note 2. 
76   Revak, 18 F.3d at 87. 
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of pro-rata share in the enterprise.77 It is therefore likely that staking agreements 
would meet horizontal commonality and thereby the commonality requirement 
under the Howey test. 
 
b. Broad Vertical Commonality 
 
It is also likely that staking agreements would meet the broad vertical 
commonality requirement. Accepted and used by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
to determine commonality, broad vertical commonality is met where the 
“investor’s fortunes are dependent on the manager’s managerial and 
entrepreneurial effort and skill in. . .producing income for the investor.”78 
The significant difference between broad and narrow commonality arises 
from the difference in how investors are dependent upon the managers of the 
enterprise. In Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., Inc., the Fifth Circuit distinguished broad 
vertical commonality from narrow vertical commonality by stating that broad 
vertical commonality occurs where investors, as a collective, rely upon the 
manager’s expertise or skill for the return of a profit.79 Similar in fashion to 
horizontal commonality, broad vertical commonality emphasizes the investors’ 
relationship to the manager as a collective, rather than on the individual 
relationship between the investor and the manager.80 Narrow vertical 
commonality emphasizes this latter relationship, discussed in the next section. 
While staking agreements likely meet the broad vertical commonality 
requirements, a federal court might rule otherwise due the effect luck or chance 
has upon a staking agreement’s return.81 On one hand, investors provide capital 
investment to professional competitors and rely upon their skill and expertise in 
their given competitive sport to receive a return upon investment. On the other 
hand, there does exist some amount of chance and/or luck involved when a 
professional player competes in their provided sport. Using poker as an example, 
however, it is more likely that poker professional skill determines future win/loss 
ratios.82 
Recent research conducted by Professor Steven D. Levitt and Dean Thomas 
J. Miles demonstrates that poker professionals perceived as skilled competitors 
have greater win/loss ratios and a greater return on investment when compared 
with non-skilled poker competitors.83 In the study, Levitt and Miles compared 
                                                        
77   See id. 
78   Gordon, supra note 55, at 68, 70. See also SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 
727, 728 (11th Cir. 2005); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 
1989).  
79   Long, 881 F.2d at 140–41. 
80   Id. 
81   See id. at 140 
82   See Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, The Role of Skill Versus Luck in Poker 
Evidence from the World Series of Poker, 15 J. SPORTS ECON. 31, 41 (Feb. 2014). 
83   Id. at 38. 
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the win/loss ratios of 720 “high-skill” poker players to the win/loss ratios of 
31,776 non-”high-skill” players at the World Series of Poker Tournament held 
in Las Vegas, Nevada.84 The study also examined the differences of “high skill” 
and non-”high skill” player return-on-investment (“ROI”), determined by 
comparing buy-in amounts with dollars received in prize money.85 Ultimately 
the study concluded that “high skill” players were “12 percent more likely to 
make. . .money than the average player, and 19 percent more likely to make the 
final table[,]” and that high-skilled players win approximately 54.9 percent of the 
match-ups throughout the tournament process.86 The study also concluded that 
un-skilled players had an average ROI of approximately -15.6 percent,87 while 
“high skilled” players had an ROI of 30.5 percent.88 
This study demonstrates that chance does play some role in the outcome of 
a professional’s ability to return a profit to a staking agreement investor, but that 
skill is the primary indicator of the likelihood that a staking agreement investor 
would receive a positive ROI.89 It is therefore likely that broad vertical 
commonality is met by a staking agreement because a staking agreement investor 
primarily relies upon the skill of the competing professional for a positive ROI. 
 
c. Narrow Vertical Commonality 
 
It is additionally likely that a staking agreement would fit the criterion 
required by narrow vertical commonality because the profits of the professional 
competitor rise or fall with the profit of the investor(s) of a staking agreement. 
Currently the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court that accepts narrow vertical 
commonality as fulfillment of the Howey test’s commonality requirement; the 
First, Second, Fourth and D.C. Circuits have not yet ruled on narrow 
commonality.90 In SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nevada, the Ninth Circuit 
defined a common enterprise as a “venture in which the fortunes of the investor 
are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking 
the investment. . ..”91 Unlike broad vertical commonality, narrow vertical 
                                                        
84   Id. (“High skill” players were determined according to six different proxies that 
included industry published rankings, past World Series of Poker “Main Event” 
champions, etc.). 
85   Id. 
86   Id. at 38, 41. 
87   Id. at 38 (A negative ROI indicated that an average player would lose money 
rather than receive any award amount over the initial buy-in investment). 
88   Id. 
89   Id. at 41. 
90   See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2001); SEC v. Banner Fund Int’l 
et al., 211 F.3d 602, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 n.8 
(4th Cir. 1994); Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994); Hocking 
v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1459 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); SEC v. Goldfield Deep 
Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985). 
91   Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d at 463 (quoting Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 
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commonality does not require a pooling of resource relationship to exist between 
investors to an enterprise. Instead, an enterprise is common under a theory of 
narrow vertical commonality where the profits of the manager of an enterprise 
rise and fall with the individual investor.92 
Application of the narrow vertical commonality test to staking agreements 
would result in staking agreements’ fulfilling the Howey test’s commonality 
requirement. The investors’ pro-rata share of any profits rise and fall based upon 
the professional competitor’s profits, i.e. award winnings, regardless of the size 
of the investor pool party to a staking agreement.93 Both the investors party to a 
staking agreement and the professional competitor backed by the agreement 
receive no return if the professional fails to procure award winnings in his or her 
competition. Likewise, the backed professional that wins the grand prize shares 
a pro-rata share with the investors party to the staking agreement.94 It is therefore 
likely that a court would find staking agreements meet the common enterprise 
requirement of the Howey test by way of narrow vertical commonality. 
 
3. Howey Test Element Three: “With the Expectation of a Profit” 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Howey additionally requires the investors in an 
offering to have a clear expectation of future profits for the offering to constitute 
an investment contract.95 The U.S. Supreme Court defined the meaning of profits 
to include (1) “capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial 
investment,” or (2) “a participation in earnings resulting from the use of 
investors’ funds.”96 An investment contract does not exist where the investor 
makes an investment with the intention to “use or consume” the purchased 
offering.97 
Investment contracts exist only where the expectation of profit is 
reasonable.98 In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered whether the shares purchased in a cooperative housing project 
by residents constituted an investment contract.99 In considering the residents’ 
expectation of a profit, the Court determined that such an expectation was 
                                                        
F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978)) (internal quotations omitted). 
92   See id. 
93   See generally Albrecht, supra note 4; Peters, supra note 10. 
94   See Albrecht, supra note 4; Peters, supra note 10. 
95   SEC v. J. W. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). 
96   United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). See Tcherepnin 
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338–339 (1967) (Investment contract where profits 
consisted of dividends off of saving and loan investments). See also SEC v. C.M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp. et al., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943) (Investment contract existed 
for sale of oil leases where conditioned on agreement to drill new well). 
97   See United Hous. Found., Inc., 421 U.S. at 852–53. 
98   Id. at 852. 
99   Id. at 851. 
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unreasonable because any expectation of income was “far too speculative and 
insubstantial. . ..”100 
Staking agreements likely produce the characterization of “profits” required 
by an investment contract by virtue of the investor capital contributing to the 
participation of the professional in the contractually-agreed-upon competition. It 
is undeniable that the investor that backs a professional competitor does not 
expect his capital to appreciate in any meaningful manner, nor does the investor 
expect to use or consume the pro-rata share of award winnings provided by a 
staking agreement. Instead, the investor expects a profit to arise from the 
professional’s ability to provide a return through award winnings. The profits 
from a staking agreement are therefore likely to fulfill the Forman profit 
definition.101 
The expectations of investors to a staking agreement are also likely 
reasonable. In Forman, the court emphasized that the expectation of the 
participants in the residential cooperative was consumption of living quarters for 
personal use and any expectation by a participant of a return based upon income 
from leasing various aspects of the building was “too speculative.”102 The 
emphasis, therefore, is on whether the expectation of the investor to receive 
income from an investment is speculative, rather than whether the investment 
itself is speculative. 
An investor to a staking agreement has an expectation to receive income 
from an initial investment by means of a professional’s award winnings. This 
expectation is not speculative because the investor acknowledges, from the 
moment they enter into a staking agreement, that income will arise from the 
ability of the professional competitor to succeed in his or her competition. It is 
therefore likely that staking agreements fulfill the third element of the Howey 
test. 
 
4. Howey Test Element Four: “With that Profit to be Realized Through the 
Efforts of Someone Other than the Investor” 
 
Finally, the professional in a staking agreement is solely responsible for the 
realization of any ROI, inferring a strong likelihood that staking agreements meet 
the final prong of the Howey test. This final Howey element requires that an 
investment contract include profits produced “solely from the efforts of 
others.”103 The Circuit Courts, while divided on the issue of commonality, accept 
the Ninth Circuit’s definition of “solely” as it applies to this final element of the 
                                                        
100   Id. at 856 (Court rejects that income derived from leasing of “commercial 
facilities, professional offices and parking spaces, and. . .operation of community 
washing machines” constitutes profits reasonably expected). 
101   See id. at 852. 
102   Id. at 856. 
103   SEC v. J. W. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
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Howey test.104 In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the Supreme Court’s use of “solely” in the Howey test shall have 
a realistic connotation rather than a literal or strict connotation.105 The Court 
reasoned that a strict interpretation of the definition of “solely” would preclude 
an offering from classification as an investment contract where the purchasing 
party contributes a “modicum of effort.”106 The Court instead emphasized that 
the measurement for this final element shall include a realistic test where “the 
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, 
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the 
enterprise.”107 
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s realistic test for “solely” to staking agreements 
reveals likely fulfillment of the final element of the Howey test. In the common 
model for staking agreements, the investor’s contribution involves only the 
provision of capital to the professional competitor.108 The professional 
competitor uses the capital to meet the necessary costs and expenses to enter into 
competitions that often have high participation fees.109 The investor’s ROI is 
entirely dependent upon the success or failure of the professional competitor or, 
as the Turner court states, the professional competitor is responsible for the 
“managerial efforts [that] affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”110 It is 
therefore likely that staking agreements fulfill the final element of the Howey 
test. 
 
C. Unusual Instruments: Marine Bank v. Weaver 
 
Through an analysis of the Supreme Court’s Howey test, it appears a court 
could logically define a common staking agreement as an investment contract. 
Staking agreements, however, must pass another test promulgated by the 
Supreme Court to receive classification as an investment contract. In Marine 
Bank v. Weaver, the Supreme Court considered whether certificates of deposit 
(“CD”) sold by a federally regulated bank constituted a security under the 
Securities Exchange Act (“Securities Act”).111 In Marine Bank, the Court 
effectively narrowed the Howey test by permitting exceptions to uncommon and 
irregular instruments that are both unique and lack financial risk.112 The Court 
                                                        
104   See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., et al., 474 F.2d 476, 481–482 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
105   Id. at 482. 
106   Id. 
107   Id. 
108   See generally Huber, supra note 38. 
109   See generally Jon Sofen, supra note 2 ($10,000 buy-in for the 2017 World Series 
of Poker Tournament in Las Vegas, Nevada). 
110   Turner, 474 F.2d at 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
111   Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 552 (1982). 
112   Id. at 556. 
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examined the number of investors involved to determine whether an instrument 
was unique, and implied that the greater the number of potential investors, the 
more likely that an agreement is not unique.113 An agreement that contains only 
a single purchaser and seller/manager, however, is likely to be unique and outside 
congressional intent for regulation under the Securities Act.114 Additionally, an 
agreement whose product contains little to no risk is less likely to constitute an 
investment contract under the Securities Act.115 In Marine Bank, the Court held 
a CD was not a security because the CD was federally insured and therefore 
posed little-to-no financial risk for potential investors.116 
It is likely that a court would determine a staking agreement to constitute an 
“uncommon or irregular instrument” as it is an agreement that falls outside the 
ordinary understanding and common definition of a security under the Securities 
Act.117 It is therefore likely that a court would apply the Marine Bank test to 
determine if a staking agreement constituted an investment contract. Depending 
on the circumstances, however, a staking agreement may or may not be unique. 
For example, the staking agreement between Mr. McEvoy and Mr. Sigel 
discussed supra Section II of this article is likely to be a unique agreement as 
defined by the Marine Bank test because the agreement is between only two 
parties.118 In contrast, YouStake’s staking agreement model is less likely to be 
defined as a unique agreement because it permits multiple potential investors to 
contribute capital to a competitor.119 
Even if a court does find that a staking agreement constitutes a unique 
offering, it is less likely, if not impossible, that a court will decide that a staking 
agreement bears little to no risk. Using poker as an example, research indicates 
that a highly skilled player wins only 54.9% of their matches throughout a 
tournament.120 When compared to a CD, a staking agreement has significantly 
more financial risk.121 Staking agreements, depending on the number of investors 
to the agreement, likely pass both the Howey test and the Marine Bank test. 
Despite passing both tests, it may be possible that federal exemptions to 
registration exempt staking agreements from registration with the SEC. 
 
 
                                                        
113   Id. at 559–560. 
114   See id. 
115   Id. at 558. 
116   Id. at 559. 
117   See id. at 556.  
118   See generally Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145–47 (Nev. 1985). 
119   See Jensen, supra note 44. 
120   See Levitt & Miles, supra note 83, at 41. 
121   Compare Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558–559 (a Certificate of Deposit has little to no 
risk of not providing a return to an investor because the instrument is federally 
insured), with Levitt & Miles, supra note 83, at 38–42 (a professional poker player 
has a 45.1% chance of losing a match). 
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D. Exemptions to Registration Under the Securities Act 
 
As has been discussed, it is likely that a court would find staking agreements 
to constitute an investment contract after application of both the Howey and 
Marine Bank tests. Under ordinary circumstances this would require issuers of 
staking agreements to register with the SEC.122 Often the process to register as a 
security with the SEC is costly, requiring the preparation of multiple complex 
forms and documents, and registered securities issuers are further required to 
complete periodic filings, forcing registrants to bear additional, future costs.123 
Staking agreements may, however, qualify for registration exemptions to the 
Securities Act to avoid initial and periodic registration costs. 
 
1. Private Placements Exemption 
 
The first possible exemption includes transactions offered by an issuer that 
do not involve any offering to the public, often called the “private placement” 
exemption.124 The Securities Act permits the exemption but neither it, nor the 
SEC, provide any further guidance to the limitations of the exemption.125 Instead, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Securities Act exemption language 
to “turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection 
of the Act.”126 Overall, the various Circuit Courts seem to agree that factors that 
help to determine whether the class of persons affected needs the Securities Act’s 
protection include, but are not limited to: “the number of offerees[,]” their 
relationship to one another and the issuer, the offerees’ sophistication, the size of 
the offering, and “the manner of the offering.”127 
Staking agreements, dependent upon the type, may be likely to escape 
registration through the private placement exemption. The more private type of 
staking agreement, similar to the one that existed between Mr. Sigel and Mr. 
McEvoy, would likely escape the registration requirement.128 First, Mr. Sigel 
was the sole offeree of the staking agreement, making it significantly smaller 
                                                        
122   See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
123   See Small Business and the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 27, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/infosmallbusqasbsechtm. 
html#fsl (These documents include preparation of Form S-1, a prospectus, and 
various other disclosure documents that provide investors with information required 
by the Securities Act of 1933). 
124   Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012). 
125   Id. 
126   SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
127   See U.S. v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1993); W. Fed. Corp. v. 
Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1984); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 
691 (1st Cir. 1978); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
128   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145 (Nev. 1985). 
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than almost every public offering.129 Second, the agreement was likely made in 
a private setting between Mr. Sigel and Mr. McEvoy. Finally, Mr. Sigel, the 
offeree, likely had sufficient sophistication to understand the terms of the 
agreement and the risks of no return from the investment. Viewed collectively, 
these factors seem to demonstrate that staking agreements made between one 
professional and one investor would be exempt under the private placement 
exception to registration. 
It is less clear that the staking agreements offered by entities like YouStake 
would be exempt under the private placement exception because of YouStake’s 
business model. YouStake advertises and markets shares of staking agreements 
to the public at large.130 Furthermore, because YouStake facilitates members of 
the general public to enter into staking agreements with professionals, the 
investors likely have no personal relationship with the professionals, in stark 
contrast with the personal relationship that existed between Mr. Sigel and Mr. 
McEvoy prior to their staking agreement.131 YouStake is also more likely to offer 
shares of a professional’s award winnings to a greater number of offerees.132 
YouStake allows participants to contribute as little as twenty dollars for a pro-
rata share in a specific campaign, permitting a large number of smaller offerees 
to participate in an otherwise high capital campaign.133 
 
2. Limited Offering Exemption 
 
Staking agreements produced both between two private parties and more 
public offerings (such as YouStake) might additionally find exemption under 
Rule 504 of the Securities Act. Rule 504 of Regulation D allows registrants an 
exemption where the registrant offers and sells no greater than $5,000,000 of 
securities within a twelve-month period.134 Additionally, a registrant that takes 
advantage of Rule 504 may not use “general solicitation and advertising” to 
promote the securities offered.135 Certain states also permit Rule 504 registrants 
to solicit or advertise to “accredited investors,” or sophisticated investors whose 
net worth exceeds $1,000,000 or yearly income exceeds $200,000 for the prior 
two years.136 
It again seems that a private agreement between two parties to a staking 
agreement, similar to the circumstances surrounding Mr. McEvoy’s staking 
                                                        
129   Id. 
130   See Jensen, supra note 44. 
131   See Sigel, 707 P.2d at 1145 (where Sigel and McEvoy entered into an oral 
agreement signifying a more personal relationship). 
132   See Jensen, supra note 44. 
133   Learn All About YouStake, supra note 44. 
134   Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 
(2018). 
135   Id. 
136   17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2018). 
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agreement, would likely find exemption under Rule 504. These private 
agreements often involve the investor contributing capital in an amount 
significantly less than the $5,000,000 cap required by Rule 504.137 If found to be 
an investment contract, however, Mr. McEvoy would still be required to file a 
Regulation D Form with the SEC to describe that the agreement fulfills the 
exemption under Rule 504.138 
It is also possible that a company with a business model similar to YouStake 
could find exemption under Rule 504 but that it would choose not to seek 
exemption. It is conceivable that YouStake could limit the amount of shares to 
staking agreements to $5,000,000 or less. This, however, would not make sense 
for YouStake’s business model for two major reasons. 
First, YouStake has an interest in making as much profit as it can within the 
market and would likely choose to bear the costs of registration under the 
Securities Act rather than forgo profit growth. Second, even if YouStake did wish 
to limit its profit growth, choosing exemption under Rule 504 would prevent 
them from advertising their services to the general public. Furthermore, 
YouStake’s business model, i.e. to get as many market participants as possible, 
would also make it unlikely that the business would choose to sell only to 
accredited investors.139 
 
3. Intrastate Offering Exemption 
 
The Securities Act also provides registration exemption to businesses that 
seek to raise capital within a particular state.140 Commonly referred to as the 
“intrastate offering” exemption, registrants may be exempt where the offering 
company is organized in the state where the offering is taking place, carries out 
most of its business within the state in which it is organized, and makes offers 
and sales solely to the residents of that state.141 Rule 147 provides objective 
standards that a company seeking to register under the intrastate exemption may 
use as guidance to satisfy the intrastate requirements.142 These factors include 
whether the company has been organized in the state in which it sells the 
securities, if the company’s principal place of business is located within the state, 
and the company verifies the residency of the purchaser of any offerings through 
written representation.143 
A staking agreement between two individuals is more likely to meet his 
                                                        
137   See Sofen, supra note 2 (illustrating, for example, that the cost for backed poker 
professionals to enter the World Series of Poker Tournament Main Event in Las 
Vegas, Nevada is $10,000). 
138   17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a) (2018). 
139   See generally Jensen, supra note 44. 
140   Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012). 
141   Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2018). 
142   17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2018). 
143   Id. 
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exemption than an agreement with a large firm such as Youstake. It is reasonable 
to suspect that a staking agreement between a single professional and a single 
investor is more likely to occur in a single state, which is also both parties’ 
domiciled state. It is also possible, however, that even these small staking 
agreements could not fulfill the intrastate exemption because the competitions 
within which the professional participates may occur outside the residency state, 
or the investor may be from a different state than the professional. 
A large company, such as YouStake, would likely not seek this exemption. 
YouStake’s business model is more likely to succeed where it is able to offer 
pro-rata shares of a professional’s awards to as many purchasers as possible. 
YouStake would not be able to meet its need for high volume investor 
participation where YouStake is limited to the state in which it was organized. 
 
4. Regulation A Offering Exemption 
 
The final exemption that may be available to participants in a staking 
agreement falls under Regulation A filing. Under Regulation A, a company 
offering securities may be exempt under either Tier 1 or Tier 2.144 Tier 1 
registration allows securities offerings that do not exceed $20,000,000 in a 
twelve-month period, while Tier 2 registration permits securities offerings that 
do not exceed $50,000,000.145 Tier 2 registration further limits non-accredited 
investor investments to either ten percent of either annual income or net worth 
(whichever is greater) or ten percent of either annual revenue or net assets at 
fiscal year-end (whichever is greater).146 Tier 1 registration has no such 
limitations.147 
Both small and large staking agreement models are likely to meet the 
requirements of Regulation A registration exemptions. Small staking 
agreements, like the agreement between Mr. McEvoy and Mr. Sigel, could likely 
file a Tier 1 Regulation A registration exemption because the capital necessary 
is significantly lower than $20,000,000 for a twelve-month period.148 A larger 
staking agreement model, such as the YouStake model, could likely use Tier 2 
Regulation A registration exemption to its advantage. First, Tier 2 limits capital 
formation to $50,000,000, a respectable amount for a private company like 
YouStake. Second, Tier 2 registration would still permit YouStake to sell to non-
accredited investors without difficulty because YouStake allows investors to 
purchase shares at as little as twenty dollars per campaign, an amount 
                                                        
144   17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018). 
145   Id. 
146   Id. 
147   Id. 
148   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145 (Nev. 1985) (where Sigel provided 
McEvoy with the capital necessary to enter into a tournament hosted by The 
Horseshoe in Nevada, an investment likely well below the $20,000,000 cap as 
required by Tier 1, Regulation A). 
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significantly less than ten percent of most participants’ annual income or net 
worth.149 
 
IV.  COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH SEC REGISTRATION 
 
Under the current federal regulatory regime, the SEC will likely eventually 
define staking agreements as an investment contract security and thereby require 
registration of the offering. As discussed in Section III(d)(i) of this article, more 
privately conducted staking agreements, such as the agreement between Mr. 
McEvoy and Mr. Sigel, will likely avoid registration under the private placement 
exemption. Staking agreements conducted on a more public, national level, such 
as YouStake’s agreements, could find exemption under the Regulation A filing 
exemption.150 Filing under Regulation A would allow YouStake to avoid 
increased regulatory costs, at the expense of other limitations such as a cap on 
securities offered in a twelve-month period (i.e. $50,000,000) and supervision of 
non-accredited investors.151 To avoid these limitations YouStake may opt for 
registration with the SEC without any exemptions whatsoever. 
Registration with the SEC would permit YouStake to raise a larger amount 
of capital through public offerings but would come at a greater cost. A study 
conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in 
2000 revealed that the cost of small business public offerings is on average ten 
percent of the required capital formation and larger business public offerings 
cost, on average, eight percent of the required capital formation.152 A smaller 
business attempting to raise $25,000,000 of capital through a public offering 
spends $2,300,000 on average to register with the SEC.153 These costs include 
$1,750,000 for underwriting discounts and commissions, $200,000 in legal fees, 
and $160,000 in accounting fees.154 These costs, while a smaller proportion of 
the capital formation desired, will only increase for a larger business attempting 
to raise more than $25,000,000. In addition to the large initial cost to register 
with the SEC, YouStake would bear the costs associated with registration with 
state securities departments,155 as well as the costs of annual reporting required 
by the SEC.156 
                                                        
149   See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297–99 (1946) (noting that 
“security” and “investment contract” have been defined broadly). 
150   See discussion supra Section III(d)(iv). 
151   See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018). 
152   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-00-190, SMALL BUSINESS: 
EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 23 (Sept. 2000). 
153   Id. 
154   Id. 
155   See generally SCOR Overview, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa. 
org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/ (last visited May 15, 
2019). 
156   See generally Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, SEC.GOV (last updated 
CRAWLEY_NOTE_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/19  2:48 PM 
Spring/Summer 2019]      A SECURITY BY ANY OTHER NAME 223 
Registration with the SEC also imposes an opportunity cost to businesses 
that need to conduct business immediately.157 The average delay that businesses 
face between filing and raising capital is approximately 104 days for smaller 
public offerings ($20,300,000) and 106 days for larger public offerings 
($198,800,000).158 Professor C. Steven Bradford, Earl Dunlap Distinguished 
Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law, argues 
that these registration delays can adversely affect small business necessities, 
including quick time-to-market and the ability to quickly raise capital.159 If 
YouStake decided to proceed with registration with the SEC absent any 
exemptions or Regulation A filings, these are the costs they would be forced to 
bear in their attempts to conduct further business. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Recently, the SEC staff from the Division of Enforcement notified YouStake 
that it was not recommending an enforcement action against YouStake.160 
According to a cursory analysis of staking agreements under the Howey and 
Marine Bank tests, however, staking agreements are likely investment contracts. 
A federal court would likely find that a staking agreement, in the words of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, is “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person 
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party[.]”161 Furthermore, staking agreements 
do not likely find exemption from definition as a security under Marine Bank 
because, while they may or may not be unique offerings, they are often 
characterized by a large amount of risk offset by a large return.162 
Despite the likelihood that staking agreements will be deemed investment 
contracts, the small number of participating investors in most staking agreements 
will allow the parties to take advantage of both state and federal registration 
exemptions. Smaller, more private staking agreements, like the agreement 
disputed in Sigel v. McEvoy, likely qualify for state registration exemption due 
to the small number of investors, as well as federal registration exemption under 
                                                        
Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeact 
reporting. 
157   C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 43 (2012). 
158   U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE 
CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES, App. A, tbl. 2 (July 24, 1996), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm. 
159   See Bradford, supra note 157, at 43. 
160   Mo Nuwwarah, YouStake Clears Major Legal Hurdle as SEC Drops 
Investigation, POKERNEWS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.pokernews.com/news/2018/ 
01/youstake-sec-drops-investigation-29684.htm. 
161   SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
162   See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558–60 (1982). 
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the private placements exemption.163 Larger, more public staking agreements, 
like YouStake’s business model, would have more difficulty qualifying for 
registration exemptions under state and federal law due to the necessity to 
advertise and the larger number of investors able to participate in a facilitated 
staking agreement. Finally, where larger staking agreements do not qualify for 
registration exemption, the average registration costs can rise to the level of eight 
to ten percent of desired capital formation, a hefty and possibly burdensome 
cost.164 
 
                                                        
163   See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d. 1145, 1145 (Nev. 1985). 
164   See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 152. 
